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Language as Encoding Thought vs. Language as Medium of Thought:  
On the Question of J. G. Fichte’s Influence on Wilhelm von Humboldt 
 
 In the epilogue to his book, Language and German Idealism: Fichte’s Linguistic 
Philosophy,1 Jere Paul Surber requests that more work be done on the question of the influence 
of J. G. Fichte’s theory of language on other (more or less) contemporary theories of language. 
Specifically he asks about Fichte’s possible influence on Wilhelm von Humboldt. 
There is indisputable evidence that Wilhelm von Humboldt spent several of his 
formative years in direct contact with Fichte’s views on language after his 
acquaintance with Herder’s writings and before his sojourn among the Parisian 
“ideologues” at the end of the century. This strongly suggests the need for further 
research into possible conceptual connections between Humboldt’s later 
formulation of his “scientific comparative methods” and the linguistic ideas of 
Fichte, particularly with respect to the project of founding linguistics upon a 
“scientific” or “systematic” philosophical basis.2  
In this essay I will consider precisely that question of the influence of Fichte on Humboldt; it 
would seem to be a historical question more than a philosophical question, but the situation is 
not that simple.  
  Here is what we know. In 1794 Fichte and Humboldt both came to Jena. Fichte was the 
new rising star in philosophy—Hölderlin said of him, “Fichte is now the soul of Jena and thank 
God that he is. I have never before known a man of such profundity and energy of intellect”3—
while Humboldt was a young man cultivating his intellect. What brought Humboldt to Jena was 
not Fichte, but Friedrich Schiller. Schiller and he had long been acquaintances and their wives 
“had dreamed … that their families might live near each other in close intimacy.”4 In 1794 
Schiller committed himself to producing the journal Die Horen and enlisted both Humboldt and 
Fichte as editors. It was in this journal in 1794 that Fichte published his only work explicitly on 
language, “On the Linguistic Capacity and the Origin of Language” (“Von der Sprachfähigkeit 
  
und dem Ursprung der Sprache”).5 Humboldt also knew his views both from attending Fichte’s 
lectures, “Über Geist und Buchstaben in der Philosophie,” and from being dragged by Fichte 
into the debate between him and Schiller over Die Horen publishing of a revision of these 
lectures. Hunboldt’s knowledge of Fichte was broad enough that he was approached by Gottfried 
Hufeland to write a review article of Fichte’s writings in Allgemeine Litteratur Zeitung, and he 
wrote of Fichte, 
Because of his tremendous workload, I do not see Fichte often, but I admire him 
immensely because of his immense speculative mind. … The theoretical part of 
the Grundlage der Gesamten Wissenschaft has now been published. There has 
perhaps never been anything more acute or more penetrating.6 
Sometime after his exposure to Fichte’s article on the origin of language, Humboldt wrote “Über 
Denken and Sprechen”7—a collection of sixteen statements on the relationship between thought 
and language.  
 In 1797 Humboldt traveled to Paris and spent significant time with the Idéologues. It is 
this interaction that Hans Aarsleff claims serves as the impetus for Humboldt’s linguistic theory.  
The Paris diaries show that Humboldt spent much time in the company of the men 
and women who represented the intellectual and philosophical life of the day. He 
formed a close friendship with Mme de Staël (continued in an extensive 
correspondence), often visited Diderot’s daughter Marie Vandeul, had lively and 
frequent discussions with Condorcet’s widow, and was regularly a guest at the 
house of the aging Mme Helvétius at Auteuil, where since long before the 
revolution she had kept the salon that is known as the Society of Auteuil, aptly 
called the Port Royal of the idéologues. … Humboldt’s sudden turn to linguistic 
anthropology occurred in this milieu. He took over not merely an orientation but 
also basic principles that form the core of his linguistic philosophy. All that he 
later wrote on this subject shows how heavy his debt was. In this sense Humboldt 
was one of the idéologues.8 
  
But as to whether the Idéologues were Humboldt's main influence is widely disputed. In rebuttal 
to Aarsleff, Paul Sweet unearths a series of disparaging comments made by Humboldt against 
Antoine Destutt de Tracy and Étienne de Condillac. Humboldt’s repeated criticism was that the 
French lacked a sufficiently metaphysical spirit—precisely the criticism we should expect from 
one who was engaged in the fruitless attempt to introduce Kant and Fichte to the empiricist, 
proto-positivist Idéologues. Wulf Oesterreicher points out that all of Humboldt’s writings on 
Condillac are critical and that we should look to Johann Gottfried Herder as the fundamental 
source of Humboldt’s ideas.9  
If Oesterreicher is right, given Fichte’s virulent attacks on Herder, it would be surprising 
if Fichte exerted a great influence. Yet both Sweet and Aarsleff argue strongly against the 
suggestion that Herder was a main influence on Humboldt. They point out that Herder’s name 
appears infrequently in Humboldt’s notes and letters.10 To add to the confusion Eduard Spranger 
and Ernst Cassirer argue that Humboldt’s primary intellectual debt is to Kant and Karl–Heinz 
Weimann argues against the Kant reading emphasizing instead Humboldt’s intellectual debt to 
Locke. If, however, Locke was the key influence on Humboldt, it was most likely via the 
Idéologues.  
Much of the debate would seem to be resolved by the 1795 essay “Über Sprechen und 
Denken,” but, in fact, the date of the essay is in question. The dating of this article is important 
since (1) it is usually taken to be Humboldt’s earliest reflections on language, and (2) part of the 
motivation for dating the article 1795 is the influence of Fichte’s 1794 “On the Linguistic 
Capacity and the Origin of Language.” Many believe that if the dating of the article could be 
placed, the prime influence of Humboldt’s Sprachphilosophie could be ascertained.11 Those who 
argue that Humboldt’s main influences were German (Herder, Kant, Fichte) argue for the given 
dating; those who argue that Humboldt’s main philosophical influences came from France argue 
that this piece is misdated. Aarsleff claims it was written around 1800; Sweet agrees, but for 
different reasons. Sweet claims that Humboldt’s Sprachphilosophie got its motivation from his 
encounters with Degérando’s 1799 Des Signes during his trip to the Basque regions of Spain in 
  
late 1799, and his reading of Bernhardi’s Sprachlehre in 1801. Against those who date the essay 
after 1795 it should be pointed out that the fact that the Humboldt’s linguistic project took shape 
only after 1800 does not imply that he could not have jotted down sixteen sentences on his 
thoughts on language in 1795 perhaps as a direct result of reading Fichte’s 1794–95 essay on 
language.  
 Among these debates about the philosophical influences on Humboldt, how do things 
stand with the case for Fichte’s influence? Not well, I am afraid. Although we know that 
Humboldt knew Fichte personally, read his work, argued on Fichte’s behalf against the Paris 
Idéologues, and that Humboldt claimed a debt to Bernhardi, a close friend of Fichte’s, we also 
know that in 1803 Humboldt wrote 
Fichte’s absolute ego (I speak merely from memory) was to me always contrary 
and obscure, because to me it appeared to sublate the actual egos and to 
hypostatize a thoroughly chimerical one. Of Schelling’s pantheism I have scarcely 
the slightest idea. But if you tell me that in each metaphysics there is a more solid 
and secure point from which one proceeds, and a more obscure point (though not 
less secure) to which one proceeds, then I think that Fichte takes as first that 
which is actually last, the absolute particular ego.12 
So Humboldt was skeptical of Fichte's account of the ego, the cornerstone of his entire 
philosophical system. 
 With respect to these historical debates about Humboldt’s influences the evidence is 
terminally ambiguous. Perhaps the best that can be said is something like this: Humboldt was 
neither a systematic philosopher, nor a systematic reader, nor a systematic commentator on 
others’ works. He was, however, personally involved with many philosophers who were 
themselves systematic readers, thinkers, and engagers. The result is that Humboldt was exposed 
to a wide variety of ideas, and, according to his intellectual temperament, leaned toward 
metaphysical speculation, but without venturing too far from empirical evidence. He assimilated 
some of these influences together in such a way to develop some central philosophical concepts 
  
from which he developed his linguistic theory. The influences are all there, but he belongs to no 
school.  Still, this only addresses the historical question.  
 Part of the problem of tracking down philosophical antecedents is that you must not only 
track down the historical connection but the conceptual one as well. We can still ask the question 
of whether a theory of language, organized and argued as Humboldt’s is, could be the direct 
product of an essay organized and argued as Fichte’s. Are the central ideas in Fichte’s essay on 
language similar enough to the ideas in Humboldt’s essay to warrant the claim that Fichte 
philosophically influenced Humboldt? My conclusion is they are not. There are features that 
distinguish their theories of language to such a degree that we can confidently conclude that the 
influence was minimal. Now just the fact that Fichte’s theory is not the sort of theory likely to 
influence Humboldt is by itself, not a very interesting conclusion. After all, Fichte did not 
influence a great number of philosophers. However, it turns out the difference between Fichte’s 
and Humboldt’s theories of language is useful for distinguishing two categorically different 
theories of language: those that focus on language primarily as a means of communication, and 
those that focus on language primarily as a vehicle of thought. Michael Dummett puts the 
question quite succinctly.  
Language, it is natural to say, has two principle functions: that of an instrument of 
communication, and that of a vehicle of thought. We are therefore impelled to ask 
which of the two is primary. Is it because language is an instrument of 
communication that it can also serve as a vehicle of thought? Or, is it conversely, 
because it is a vehicle of thought, and can therefore express thoughts, that it can 
be used by one person to communicate his thoughts to others?13  
This distinction has implications for views on the development of language (especially with 
respect to personal pronouns), and views on the nature of understanding. 
 The question of the origin of language may strike many contemporary thinkers as an odd 
one, certainly an odd one for philosophy to attempt to adjudicate. However the answers to the 
Ursprungsfrage always include views on the relationship between language and reason. For 
  
example, is language necessary for rational thought? If so, what is the effect of language on 
thinking? In addition, the debate establishes the discipline appropriate for understanding the 
nature of language, be it philosophical, empirical, or even theological. J. P. Süssmilch argued 
both that humans need language for the use of reason, and that language must be the effect of a 
rational cause. Since humans could not acquire their ability to reason prior to the emergence of 
language, and since reason is required for the creation of language, language must have 
originated in another, non-human rational source—God.14 The study of language and reason 
belongs n the end to theology. In his 1772 prize-winning essay, Herder countered this by arguing 
that language and reason developed together over time, and thus we do not need to appeal to 
divine providence as an explanation.15 Both Fichte and Humboldt follow Herder in arguing that 
language and reason develop together, and thus what is needed is a philosophically guided 
history of the development of reason. To see why it is Humbold’ts view is not the kind of view 
one would expect to derive from Fichte’s view, we need to know more about Fichte’s view of 
language. 
 Surber makes the following claim: “One will look in vain for any discussion of a direct 
influence by Fichte at the beginning of Humboldt’s reflections upon language, since these 
histories seem totally unaware of even the existence of Fichte’s essay and widely attended 
lectures on the subject.”16  Regularly Surber points out that the influence of Fichte on Humboldt’s 
early development is “passed over” by commentators on Humboldt; in support of his case Surber 
lays out three points Fichte makes such that “if one were to seek the roots of the methodological 
spirit, if not the details, of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s linguistic research, they appear here [in 
Fichte] far more so than in Herder, Kant, or the French tradition.”17 The three points are that  
[First] Fichte clearly saw that grammatical considerations are directly relevant to 
philosophical issues. … [Second] Fichte was the first to and probably the only 
modern Idealist philosopher to envision a general strategy whereby a 
reconstruction of grammatical determinations could be used for both to reinforce 
and to defend a theoretical project otherwise vulnerable to “metacritical” attack. 
  
… [And third] Fichte seems to have realized the limitations of the sort of vague 
or mystified empirical generalizations about language that dominated most of the 
eighteenth century preceding him, as well as to have anticipated the nineteenth-
century traditions of linguistics that sought to explore connection among observed 
features of existing languages, their underlying structural and grammatical 
similarities and derivations, and the philosophical assumptions upon which these 
inquiries rested.18  
Although both Fichte and Humboldt share the philosophical importance of the grammatical 
features of language, the way they are important varies and suggests instead that the influence is 
not as Surber suggests. To get clear on their differences, in spirit and in letter, we need to look 
closely at both thinker’s views. 
 Fichte makes it clear from the start of his essay “On the Linguistic Capacity and the 
Origin of Language” that the project of discovering the origin of language is not an empirical 
project, but rather one of “deriving the necessity of this invention [language] from the nature of 
human reason; [that is to say] one must demonstrate that and how language must have been 
invented.”19 Already Fichte is locating himself in the debate about the origin of language. The 
three base answers to the question of the origin of language I'll call innatism, conventionalism, 
and divine providence. The innatists, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, argued that language was 
innate in human nature; the conventionalists, like Locke and Condillac, argued that language was 
invented by humans and the meanings were eventually fixed through convention; the divine 
providentialists, like Süssmilch, argued that God gave humans their linguistic capacity. At stake 
in the differences between these views are the limits of philosophical investigation vis-à-vis 
empirical investigations on the one side and faith on the other. The innatists concluded that we 
should seek philosophical explanations of the origin of language; conventionalists argued that 
empirical, comparative linguistics is best suited to answer the question; and divine 
providentialists claimed that it is a question of faith. In the above quotation Fichte is splitting his 
allegiance between the innatists and the conventionalists. He argues that, on the one hand, 
  
language develops necessarily from the nature of human reason, thus he is partially an innatist; 
yet, on the other hand, it is still an invention, thus he is partially a conventionalist.20 Contrary to 
other conventionalists, his methodology is not empirical (“one might think that since I can call a 
book ‘liber’, ‘b¢iblioh,’ ‘buch,’ and so forth, one nation must have agreed to name its particular 
object ‘buch’ another ‘liber’, and so on. But we should not put much stock in such a agreement, 
since it is most improbable”21). Contrary to other innatists, he argues that language is constructed 
out of “arbitrary signs” [willkürliche Zeichen] rather than natural cries (“the involuntary eruption 
of emotion is not language”22). In fact his definition is: “Language, in the broadest sense of the 
word, is the expression of our thoughts by means of arbitrary signs.”23 By definition, then, Fichte 
eliminates the version of innatism that places the origin of language in the instinctual expressions 
of emotions. Fichte does acknowledge that communication can occur through instinctual 
expressions of emotion (we can often tell someone’s feelings by their facial expressions), but 
this communication cannot yet be considered linguistic since it does not yet operate through 
signs. Nor is communication the function of involuntary expression.  
For anything that can properly be called language, one must intend absolutely 
nothing more than the signification of thought; and language has no purpose 
whatsoever beyond this signification, … no other purpose than that of 
occasioning the representation of a particular object in the other person.24  
This rules out instinctual actions, but not such signifying gestures as pointing or drawing a 
representation of something (signs used specifically for the purpose of communicating thoughts). 
This is what Fichte means by saying the signs must be “arbitrary” [willkürlich]. Since the first 
function of reason is to serve purposeful action—that is, to find the appropriate means to willed 
ends—the choice involved in expressing one’s thoughts through signs is a product of reason. 
Consequently, Fichte can claim that reason is the ultimate source for the motivation for the 
invention of language.25 Before Herder’s essay, this would be a sufficient account of the origin of 
language. Herder’s central claim, however, is that one must explain the ability to recognize 
  
sounds as signs in the first place. Fichte therefore needs to show that the very idea of presenting 
one’s thought in language arises from the nature of reason.26  
 Fichte first examines the way that reason operates as such. He claims, “it is fundamental 
to man’s very essence that he seeks to subjugate the power of nature. The first expression of his 
own power is directed toward nature in order to shape it to his own ends.”27 The general drive 
under which humans try to subjugate nature follows “the highest principle in man”: “Be always 
at one with yourself.”28 This drive is “interwoven through his entire being and without any 
contribution of his free will” and functions to make everything “harmonize with his reason, since 
only under that condition can he come into harmony with himself.”29 Since “nature resists his 
efforts and often enough rejects it altogether … we are in constant warfare with nature.”30 The 
same relationship of constant warfare does not exist, however, between human beings. Fichte’s 
argument is that if it were the case that everyone constantly tried to subjugate others to their own 
will then there would be “a war of all against all.” Since humans actually do get along, “in the 
primordial nature of man a principle must be discernible which makes him behave differently 
towards others of his own kind than he behaves toward nature.” When one encounters another 
already rational person “he will be glad to have met with a being attuned to himself—another 
human being.”31 Instead of trying to shape them to our ends, we see others persons as potential 
partners in our attempt to submit nature to our ends.32 As a result of the awareness of others as 
rational, the drive to subjugate nature, guided by “the highest principle in man,” produces 
language.33 
 At the heart of this view is the idea that we can have thoughts prior to their realization in 
language. Fichte writes: 
I do not prove here that man does not think without language and that without it 
he could have had no universal abstract concepts. He is capable of this simply by 
means of the pictures which he projects by his imagination. It is my conviction 
that language has been held to be much too important if one believed that without 
it no use of reason at all would have occurred.34 
  
Humboldt holds the contrary view—that we need language as a medium of thought. Let’s turn to 
that view found in the early “On Thinking and Speaking.” 
 Humboldt’s first claim is that “(1) The essence of thinking consists in reflecting, i. e., in 
distinguishing the thinking from that which is thought about.”35 That is to say, the essence of 
thinking rests in its function to present an object to consciousness in a manner that differs from 
the object as given in perception. In the latter case, the object is given in the world; in the former 
case, it is given in the mind of the subject. In order to re-present this object to consciousness “(2) 
the mind must … stand still for an instant to gather what was just represented into a unity and in 
this manner to posit it as an object against itself [as a subject].”36 The subject unifies the 
perceptual manifold isolating one object from the background of sensations. According to 
Humboldt, this requires comparing many formed unities, separating and combining them into a 
unified object: “(4) The essence of thinking consists, therefore, in making sub-divisions in its 
own course; thereby to form totalities out of certain portions of its own activity; and these 
formations singly among themselves, but all together as objects, to posit against the thinking 
subject.”37 In order to go about this process of forming unities the subject must be guided by 
certain principles or ideals that dictate which particular sensations become unified as objects. 
These he calls “the universal forms of sensibility [Sinnlichkeit].” “(5) No thinking, not even the 
purest can take place without the aid of the universal forms of sensibility; only in them can we 
comprehend the object and, as it were, hold it fast [before consciousness].”38 “Sensibility” is as 
ambiguous of a word as its German counterpart, Sinnlichkeit. It connotes intelligibility and 
meaningfulness, but also emphasizes the sensuous character of that intelligibility. It denotes the 
availability of the object to our physical senses.39 Humboldt thinks that sensibility is necessary for 
all thinking, even the most “pure” thinking. The obvious question is the source of these forms of 
sensibility. Here Humboldt claims that “(6) [n]ow, the sensuous [sinnlich] signification of units, 
into which certain portions of thinking are united, in order to be posited as parts against other 
parts of a bigger totality, as objects to the subject, is called in the broadest understanding of the 
word: language.”40 Language is the means by which reflection can divide up the world into 
  
objects. One could not have reflection without language, nor could one have language without 
reflection. This relationship between language and reflection is quite different than Fichte’s, and, 
quite frankly, as it stands it would seem to be false. Infants can certainly recognize things as 
objects before they can understand language, therefore (one might say) the reflective power of 
thought to produce unities in the manifold must be able to operate without language.  
 The key to answering this objection is signaled in the concluding statement of the first 
argument. 
(7) The language therefore begins immediately and at once with the first act of 
reflection, and just as man awakens from the dimness of lust, in which the subject 
swallows the object, to self-consciousness, the word is also there—as it were the 
first impetus which man gives to himself, suddenly to standstill, to look around, 
to orient himself.41 
According to Humboldt, it is not merely isolating an object in the perceptual field, and 
differentiating that object in the mind from that object in the world, but also being self-aware as 
oriented in the world toward the objects of the world. That is, it involves the awareness of 
ourselves as objects in the world as well as subjects for whom the world exists. Infants, although 
being aware of objects in the world, are not aware of themselves as being aware—they are not 
reflexively aware. Humboldt holds the more sophisticated view that language is necessary for 
this objectifying relation to oneself and the world.  
 In the last clause of the above quotation he says that language is “the first impetus which 
man gives to himself, suddenly to stand still, to look around, to orient himself”—in other words, 
to reflect. Contrary to Fichte’s view that we develop language to communicate our purposes to 
others—an activity that is clearly posterior to the reflective appropriation of the world—
Humboldt says that language is the “impetus” to our attempt to reflectively appropriate the 
world. The German word translated as “impetus” is Anstoss.42 Language, on Humboldt’s account 
is the Anstoss. It summons us to reflectively take up the world and ourselves as objects, and it 
determines our reflective powers by being the source of “the universal forms of sensibility.” 
  
 The second conclusion is that linguistic signs are differentiated primarily as sounds. 
Humboldt writes,  
(11) The most cutting of all the changes in time are those which the voice 
produces. … (12) The language-signs are therefore necessarily sounds and … 
man was bound, as soon as he recognized clearly an object as separate from 
himself, immediately to pronounce also the sound which was to signify it.43 
There are two important points here. First, communication is elevated to being more than the 
expression of thought, rather the sharing of sounds becomes the means by which reflection is 
accomplished. When we recognize anything we instinctively say the name of that thing, at least 
to ourselves; In this respect, we may say that on Humboldt’s view language plays the role of 
narrating reflection. When we are aware of something we designate our awareness of it to 
ourselves by expressing it in words. The second point is his emphasis on the activity of dialogue 
as the telos of language. Thirty years later he would write, 
There lies in the primordial nature of language an unalterable dualism, and the 
very possibility of speech is conditioned by address and response. Even thinking 
is essentially accompanied by the inclination toward social existence, and one … 
longs for a Thou which will correspond to his I. Concepts seem to attain 
definition and certainty for him only when they are reflected by a thinking power 
other than his own.44 
Contained in the idea of objectivity is the possibility of being for many subjects, thus it is only 
through the actuality of the object being for many subjects that the objectivity of the object is 
established. Language is an intersubjective medium, and therefore anything designated in 
language is intersubjectively recognizable, yet anything which is articulated anew into language, 
and as a result comes to “attain definition and certainty” for the first time, must be recognized 
and verified by someone else as being such. We can see emerging what will become Humboldt’s 
most famous claim about language. 
  
Language, taken as real, is something which constantly and in every moment 
passes away. Even its preservation in writing is only an incomplete mummified 
depository which needs, for full understanding, an imaginative oral 
reconstruction. Language is not a product [ergon] but an activity [energia].45 
Language is not something static (as Fichte thought), but exists only in the activity of 
communicatively expressing ourselves to one another. Returning to the main issue, there are two 
ways in which language functions in thinking: as the means by which we individuate objects for 
reflection, and as the means by which we establish the objectivity of the objects. In both cases 
the focus remains on the spoken word.46  
 What we find in Humboldt and Fichte are not simply differences between theories of the 
origin of language and theories of the relationship between thought and language, but different 
types of theories of language altogether. Let’s consider two consequences that fall out of their 
respective theories of language: their theories of the place of pronouns in the development of 
language, and their theories of the process of communicative understanding. Fichte claims that 
nouns develop first in a language, and then pronouns arise to replace nouns. He writes,  
The various persons of the verbs were undoubtedly constructed in the following 
order. The person first signified in language was certainly the third, for originally 
this was the only person in which anyone spoke. Everyone was called by his 
proper name: “N. shall do this!” After the third, it was the second person that 
came to have a special signification, since in agreements and contracts one soon 
felt the need to say to the other: “You shall do this.” The ‘I’ as the first person, 
especially where it is attached to the ending of the verb itself, evidences a higher 
rational culture and was thus signified last. We see that children always speak of 
themselves in the third person and refer to themselves as the subject of which the 
want to speak by their names. This is because they have not yet arrived at the 
concept of the ‘I,’ at the separation of the self from everything outside of them. 
‘I’ expresses the highest character of reason.47  
  
For Fichte, the supreme idealist, the I is the highest point of reason and thus could be present 
only in societies capable of the highest forms of reasoning. In an 1829 essay, “On the 
Relationship of the Locative Adverbs with the Personal Pronouns in a Few Language,” 
Humboldt presents what is essentially Fichte’s view using one of Fichte’s own examples. “We 
notice that children for a long time use names and other objective relations in place of pronouns. 
This has lead to the claim that the pronoun has always developed late in language in general.”48 
Yet, responds Humboldt, “this claim is not expressed correctly. The pronoun in the language 
must be originary.”49 Rather than nouns preceding pronouns, Humboldt claims that pronouns 
have a linguistic priority over nouns. What makes this seem odd, is that pronouns seem to 
function first and foremost as substitutes for nouns. Therefore we would expect that nouns would 
precede pronouns. Humboldt’s claim is that such a conclusion results from an incomplete 
analysis of language. In order to fully understand the “inner” nature of language we need to 
analyze the pragmatic function of words in speech.50 The motivation here is the view that the 
only way language can serve as an intersubjectively shared medium of communication is if it 
serves as an adequate medium for the expression of thoughts. According to Humboldt, when we 
consider language in its expressive function rather than as an object, we find that 
“I” does not refer to that [concrete object] which manifests specific characteristics 
within specific spatial relationships, but rather that which is right now in the 
consciousness of an opposing subject. ... Likewise with “you” and “he”: all are 
hypostatised relational concepts.51 
The pronoun I does not replace a noun, but designates the position of the speaker within 
dialogue. The I is the one who speaks; the Thou is the one who is spoken to. The expressive role 
of the pronoun is to indicate the relations between the interlocutors. This is not to say that 
pronouns cannot stand for nouns—they often do—only that one of the essential functions of 
pronouns in speech is irreducible to the function of standing in for other nouns.52 How we are 
going to view the importance of personal pronouns will vary according to whether we think the 
primary function of language is to encode thought, or to be the medium of thought.  
  
 The differences in their theories of language will carry over into differences in their 
theories of the process of communicative understanding. In the lectures collected under the title 
“Concerning the Difference Between the Spirit and the Letter within Philosophy” Fichte 
addresses the process of communication.53 Since “spirits are unable to affect each other 
immediately,”54 Fichte claims that communicative understanding occurs when one accurately 
interprets the noises made by another person as representatives of thoughts.  
Taken in themselves, my words are no more than an empty noise, a movement in 
the air which surrounds us. I do not give them whatever meaning they have for 
you (assuming they make rational sense to you). You place a meaning in these 
words for yourself, just as I place a meaning in them for myself. The more closely 
the meaning you place in them approximates the meaning I wished to place in 
them, the better you understand me.55 
Humboldt, to the contrary, argues that communication is quite literally thinking together. He 
writes, “The mutual interdependence of thought and word illuminates clearly the truth that 
languages are not really means for representing already known truths rather instruments for 
discovering previously unrecognized ones.”56 The words are meaningful already, and 
communication—the sharing of words—is then a shared activity of discovering of the world and 
locating oneself in the world. What we have here are examples of two fundamentally different 
approaches to the nature of language. The authors were aware of the extent and the implications 
of these differences and as such we can conclude that Fichte’s theory of language is not the sort 
of theory of language that would philosophically influence a theory of language like 
Humboldt’s. Fichte and Fichtean views may have provided a context for Humboldt's initial 
investigations into the nature of language, but did not influence the content of Humboldt's views.  
 Yet, there is another possible place of influence on Humboldt by Fichte. Recall that 
Surber's question draws specific attention to “possible conceptual connections between 
Humboldt’s later formulation of his ‘scientific comparative methods’ and the linguistic ideas of 
Fichte, particularly with respect to the project of founding linguistics upon a ‘scientific’ or 
  
‘systematic’ philosophical basis.”57 Might it be the case that although their views on the nature of 
language differed, they shared a view about what a proper Sprach-Wissenschaft entailed? I'm 
afraid not. To see this we will need to look more closely at their respective understandings of 
what it would mean to scientifically or philosophically ground linguistics; again (perhaps 
unsurprisingly) their differing views on the nature of language will shape their views on what 
constitutes a scientific analysis of language. 
 Fichte's account of science has two parts, systematicity and apodicticity. He writes: “A 
science possesses systematic form. All the propositions of a science are joined together in a 
single first principle in which they unite to form a whole.”58 The “first principle” must be “prior 
to and independent of the science” that it unites. That is to say, the principle cannot belong to the 
science itself. If a region of study can meet these criteria, it is a science. It is clear from Fichte’s 
presentation of the origin of language and the development of grammar that he believes the study 
of the Ursprache can have such scientific status. Recall he claims one must “deriv[e] the 
necessity of this invention from the nature of human reason; one must demonstrate that and how 
language must have been invented”59 and this derivation begins from the “highest principle of 
man”—“Be always at one with yourself.” This first principle is both independent of a science of 
grammar as such, and derivable from the first principle of the Wissenschaftslehre (the science of 
all sciences in which all first principles are derived), “I=I.” Is this the project Humboldt attempts 
in (for example and especially) his introduction to the study of the Kawi language? 
 About that work Humboldt wrote: 
My aim is ... a study that treats the faculty of speech in its inward aspect, as a 
human faculty, and which uses its effects as sources of knowledge and examples 
in developing the argument. I wish to show that what makes any particular 
language what it is, is its grammatical structure and to explain how the 
grammatical structure in all its diversities still can only follow certain methods 
that will be listed one by one, so that, by the study of each language, it can be 
shown which methods are dominant or mixed in it. Now, in these methods 
  
themselves I consider of course the influence of each on the mind and feeling, and 
their explanation in terms of the causes of the origins of language, in so far as this 
is possible. Thus I connect the study of language with the philosophical survey of 
humanity’s capacity for formation [Bildung] and with history.60 
Now the very fact that Humboldt turns to an empirical analysis of a natural language should lead 
us to suspect the differences between his conception of a science of language and Fichte’s 
conception are dramatically different. Indeed recall that we pointed out that one debate at stake 
in the question of the Ursprache is the appropriate discipline for the study of the nature of 
language. If one were a conventionalist, one would turn to actual historical stages of the 
consensual establishment of meaning; if one were an innatist, one would turn to philosophical 
investigations of human nature; and if one were a divine providentialist one would turn to 
theology. In fact, neither Fichte nor Humboldt falls squarely into these categories. On the one 
hand, both combine innatism and conventionalism and it is this combination that leads Surber to 
suggest the connections he does. Clearly the combination of innatism and conventionalism 
allowed Fichte and Humboldt “to explore connections among observed features of existing 
languages, their underlying structural and grammatical similarities and derivations, and the 
philosophical assumptions upon which these inquiries rested.”61 On the other hand, Fichte is an 
innatist in that he believes that language springs from human nature, but a conventionalist in that 
he believes that language was (and had to be) invented. Humboldt is a conventionalist in that he 
thinks language was invented, but an innatist in thinking that this invention had to occur 
according to certain, telelogically driven formal structures (innere Sprachformen). It is these 
teleologically driven formal structures that Humboldt refers to when he claims “the grammatical 
structure in all its diversities still can only follow certain methods.” These grammatical 
structures, in turn, operate to structure the contents of consciousness; thus Humboldt’s famous 
proto-Wittgensteinian claim: “The differences between languages are not those of sounds and 
signs but of differing world views.”62 As a language can never be properly understood as an 
object but only as an activity—as medium of thought rather than a tool for encoding thought—it 
  
is not possible to analyze language abstracted from the actual, historical practices of expressions. 
The foundation for a science of language must be empirical, not transcendental, and this follows 
directly from his theory of language. It is fair to conclude, then, that the philosophical 
differences between Fichte’s theory of language and Humboldt’s theory of language are so 
extensive as to rule out the likelihood of influence.  
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